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With deep pride and an equal measure of sadness the Editors of the
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WILLIAM HuGHEs MULLIGAN
Dean

FEDERAL TAX CLAIMS: NATURE AND EFFECT OF
THE GOVERNMENT'S WEAPONS FOR COLLECTION
J. HARRY CROSS*
A TAX debtor's property is the principal object of weapons for enforcing
collection of his delinquent taxes. If just two parties were involved,
the Government and the tax debtor, relatively few collection problems of
a legal nature would result. Thus, if a tax debtor owned all his property
in the same exclusiveness of ownership that he owns his shoes, for
instance, the absence of third party interests would mean no competition
from that source with remedies for collection of his tax. Competition
arises, however, where third parties have diverse interests in the property.
Should their antecedent interests be taken for the federal taxes of another
party? Resolution of the competition has varied from time to time. Cur-
rently, the federal resolution is startling, because of judicial decisions
which have produced a veritable revolution in tax collection impacts. On
third parties, there are federal impacts that are latent and dangerous. The
development of these impacts will appear in the course of tracing the
statutory and decision law.
A claim for taxes does not ex proprio vigore give any special remedy
for collection.' Without the aid of statute, the tax creditor would be but
a general creditorY
The federal government has various statutory remedies for collection
of taxes, principally3 by three types of statutes: (1) the priority statute,
(2) the general tax lien statute and (3) the bankruptcy statute. The
nature and effect of these three weapons will be considered.
I. THE PRIORITY STATUTE
History and Interpretation of the Statute
This is the earliest of the three statutes, dating from 17904, the days of
the First Congress. The statute was broadened in 1797, and since then
* Member of the Maryland Bar.
1. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247, 259-60 (1935); 27 A. & E.2d 735, 782;
61 C.J., Taxation §§ 1155, 1359 (1933); Peppin, Priority of Tax and Special Assessment
Liens, 23 Calif. L. Rev. 264, 265-67 (1935).
2. To escape this result, one court sought to work out a sovereign prerogative in the
payment of federal taxes, notwithstanding the United States does not possess the common-
law prerogative of the sovereign to be first paid. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson
Shipyards Corp., 6 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd sub nom. Stripe v. United States, 269
U.S. 503 (1926).
3. Miscellaneous special statutes include: Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 6324 (lien for estate
and gift taxes), 5004, 5177 (lien on distilled spirits), 7202-03 (making crimes of certain wilful
failures to pay certain taxes), 7501 (withholding taxes special fund in trust for the United
States).
4. This first enactment on the subject was limited to "bonds" for the payment of
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has not undergone significant amendment. 5 It is commonly known as
section 3466 and the essence of the statute is that: "debts due to the
United States shall be first satisfied"6 in four cases: (1) death of the
debtor without sufficient assets; (2) commission of an act of bankruptcy;
(3) voluntary assignment by the insolvent of all his property to pay his
debts; (4) an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor whose estate and
effects are attached by process of law.
Constitutionality of the statute was early upheld by the Supreme Court
in the Fisher case,' decided in 1804. The principle was there settled that
the United States is entitled to secure to itself the exclusive privilege of
being preferred to private citizens, and even to the state authorities, in
all cases of the insolvency or bankruptcy of the debtor.
The statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the Government.
This kind of construction was early,8 as well as recently,9 declared by the
Supreme Court. It is based on the purpose of the statute "to secure an
adequate public revenue to sustain the public burdens and discharge the
public debts."" It is perhaps worthy of note that so eminent an authority
as Chancellor Kent expressed the view that ". . . it is proper that this pre-
rogative right of the United States should be strictly construed and pre-
cisely defined, for it is in derogation of the general rights of creditors.""
For well over a century the liberal construction was applied with
judicial restraint, and therefore did not produce expanding effects; but
at the end of that period and commencing with the second quarter of the
present century, a fork in the road appeared, and as a result the same
statutory language has been given broader interpretation. Certain de-
velopments will now be considered.
The word "person" was early held to include a corporate debtor of the
United States.'
The word "debts" was long regarded as not including taxes. As one
court said: "They are two very distinct matters. A debt is not a tax, and a
tax is not a debt."'" But in the Price case,' 4 decided in 1926, the Supreme
revenue duties. Further legislative history through 1799 is recited in Annot., 1913 L.RA.
226-27.
5. Price v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
6. 31 U.S.C.A. § 191 (1954).
7. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805). See Spokane County
v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
8. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 134 (1838).
9. United States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 426 (1941).
10. United States v. State Bank, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 29, 35 (1832).
11. 1 Kent, Commentaries 247 (1896).
12. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102 (1838).
13. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corp., 6 F.2d. 752, 755 (2d Cir. 1925).
14. See note 5 supra.
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Court rejected any distinction and held that the word "debts" in the
statute included taxes. Thus, for the first time, a century and a quarter
later, the statute became applicable to the Government's claims for taxes.
Nature of the Priority
In the course of upholding the constitutionality of the statute, Chief
Justice Marshall took the occasion to describe the nature and effect of the
priority, stating:
"On this subject it is to be remarked, that no lien is created by this law. No bona
fide transfer of property, in the ordinary course of business, is overreached. It is only
a priority in payment, which, under different modifications, is a regulation in common
use; and this priority is limited to a particular state of things when the debtor is living;
though it takes effect generally if he be dead."15
In United States v. Hooe,1 decided by the Supreme Court in 1805,
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized the no-lien aspect in this vigorous
language:
"In construing the statutes on this subject, it has been stated by the court, on great
deliberation, that the priority to which the United States are entitled does not partake
of the character of a lien on the property of public debtors. This distinction is always
to be recollected."'.
Deep appreciation of this distinction, "always to be recollected," was
the antithesis of the statute affecting any lien, general or specific. For over
a century the Supreme Court recognized as much.' In short, the statute
did not cut off, or interfere with, antecedent liens of other parties. And
this remained the law until a series of decisions commencing in 1929.
This protection of antecedent liens of all kinds, it should be noted, was
upheld against the extraordinary contention of the Government that:
". .. the priority, thus created by law, if it be not of itself a lien, is still superior to
any lien, and even to an actual mortgage, on the personal property of the debtor."'19
The rejection of this extraordinary contention was further supported by
holding that the preference is in the appropriation of the debtor's estate, 0
namely, his general funds.2 This clearly meant that the debtor's estate
is what is left after satisfying all antecedent interests of others.2 2  Still
15. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 390 (1805).
16. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805).
17. Id. at 89.
18. Brent v. Bank, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 611-12 (1836). Chancellor Kent so understpod
the cases. 1 Kent, Commentaries 247 n. a (1896). See also United States v. Guaranty Trust
Co., 33 F.2d 533, 536-37 (8th Cir. 1929) ; 9 Ops. Att'y Gen. 28, 29 (1857).
19. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 440-41 (1828).
20. Brent v. Bank, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 611 (1836).
21. United States v. Hack, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 271, 275 (1834).
22. United States v. Lewis, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15595, at 924 (C.C.E.m. Pa.), aff'd, 92
U.S. 618 (1875).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
further, the priority operates only where, by law, or by act of the debtor,
his property is sequestered for the use of his creditors.2 3 Until such se-
questration, the priority does not arise or apply.
A consideration reinforcing this limitation was pointed out in the Hooe
case, Chief Justice Marshall stating that if the Government's priority
statute claim existed from the time the debt was contracted, and the
debtor continued to transact business with the world, the inconvenience of
that priority would certainly be very great, and if the priority were to
apply from the instant the debtor became indebted to the United States, it
would be in the nature of a lien, which it is not.
The Inchoate Lien and the Perfected Lien
In a series of cases commencing in 1929 the Supreme Court launched
in a new and different direction-inchoate lien versus specific perfected
lien. -4 Shortly, the Court displaced an inchoate general lien in United
States v. Knott..2 5 There, a foreign surety company deposited securities
with the State Treasurer of Florida in order to qualify to do business and
for the protection of Florida creditors. It entered into many surety
obligations in Florida. Upon its insolvency, the United States filed a
claim for priority for judgments recovered against the company in Florida
on bail bonds given there. The Florida officials insisted that the claim of
the United States must be postponed to those of Florida creditors. In
construing the state statutes, the Supreme Court of Florida declared that
the deposit constituted a "trust fund" for the benefit of those whom the
state had the power and duty to protect, and the United States was not
such a beneficiary. The Supreme Court of the United States approached
the matter from the standpoint of what would bar the priority of the
United States, holding:
"Unless the law of Florida effected, at least as early as the date of insolvency, either
a transfer of title from the company, or a specific perfected lien in favor of the Florida
creditors, the United States is entitled to priority."26
On the point of title, the Court held that the deposit did not divest the
company's title to the securities. On the point of specific perfected lien,
the Court held:
"While in the case at bar the Supreme Court [of Florida] declared that the deposit
created 'a trust fund,' the term appears to have been used to connote an inchoate general
23. Bramwell v. United States Fidelity Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926); 1 Kent,
Commentaries 247 (1896).
24. See e.g., Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929) ; Kennedy, The Relative
Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General
Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905, 911-12 (1954).
25. United States v. Knott, 298 U.S. 544 (1936).
26. Id. at 549-50.
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lien for the benefit of those persons who may become entitled to be paid from the pro-
ceeds, either as unsatisfied judgment creditors, or as Florida creditors at the time when
insolvency supervenes. Such an interest lacks the characteristics of a specific perfected
lien which alone bars the priority of the United States."
27
Next, the Court dealt with a specific perfected lien. Does it bar the pri-
ority of the United States? Although the Knott case squarely answered
the point by saying that such lien "bars the priority of the United
States, the Court later said that that statement:
".... was not intended to settle the problem and may be taken to have been made with
reference to the early mortgage lien cases ...."29
The Court further asserted that "the Court has never decided""
whether the priority is overcome by a fully perfected and specific lien;
a question which, the Court thought, had been reserved in the early cases.
Although a later case in the Supreme Court makes a similar assertion,31
the question was met head on and decided against the Government in
1954 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit32 which
said:
"This statute applies only as against unsecured debts, that is, debts not secured by a
specific and perfected lien. It has never been, we think it will never be, applied as it is
sought to be applied here, to accord payment to a debt due the United States in preference
to a claim secured by a lien which is prior in time and superior in law to the lien of the
United States securing the debt for which preferential payment is sought."1
33
The Approach of the Supreme Court
The Court's approach, in the latest series of cases, has been to analyze
the characteristics of the particular competing lien, and then to hold that
it "does not raise the question."34 A further question therefore arises:
what characteristics of a competing lien will raise the main question?
It would be futile to try to rationalize.3 5
On the one hand, the main elements have been simply stated: (1)
identity of the lienor; (2) the amount of the lien; and (3) the property to
which it attaches.3 These elements, as of the crucial time (arising of the
federal priority right), must be definite and not merely ascertainable in
the future by taking further steps.3 On the other hand, the Court has
27. Id. at 550-51.
28. Id. at 551.
29. People ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 370 n. 10 (1946).
30. Id. at 370.
31. United States v. Gilbert Associates Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953).
32. United States v. Atlantic Municipal Corp., 212 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1954).
33. Id. at 711.
34. United States v. Gilbert Associates Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 365 (1953).
35. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Tubbs Mfg. Co., 246 F.2d 141, 143 (5th Cir. 1957).
36. 'People ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 375 (1946).
37. Ibid.
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indulged in a veritable maze of refinements in regard to these elements. 8
If there is any single direction, it may possibly be described as towards an
inordinate quest for certainty as of the crucial time regarding fulfillment
of the stated elements.
On the problem of whether a competing state statutory lien is specific
and perfected, a question arises whether the decision of a state supreme
court which construes its own statute to create a specific and perfected
lien is binding on the United States Supreme Court. This question has
arisen various times, and in the latest series of cases every lien has been
a state statutory lien. Although hemmed in by the state court's construc-
tion, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept it, and so has pro-
ceeded in another direction by simply making the lien's actual legal effect
a "federal" question.39 So denominating the question enables the Su-
preme Court to re-examine other courts' decisions, including their con-
struction of their own statutes, and to render final decision. Significantly,
the Supreme Court in modern cases has not yet found a single lien to be
sufficiently specific and perfected, in its judgment, to defeat, or even to
raise the question of defeating the priority of the United States.
The recent emphasis on the matter of inchoate lien versus specific and
perfected lien is completely at variance with the Court's approach for
the last century. Although the Court has not rejected the great delibera-
tion of the early cases that the priority neither is a lien nor partakes of
the character of a lien, nevertheless the question arises as to what has
happened to Chief Justice Marshall's vigorous admonition. The language
of the priority statute has not changed. No broader will of Congress is
involved. Contemporaneous construction of a statute sheds valuable light
upon statutory meaning,4" and ample light was afforded by the early cases.
No reason for departure is discernible. Yet, in the last quarter century,
without the aid of Congress, the Supreme Court has built a detour road
around the priority statute.
The Question of Title
It would be misleading to think that defeat of the priority statute has
to involve the difficult matter of specific and perfected lien, despite the
prominence given this matter in the latest series of cases. Potent matters
are devestment of (1) title to, or (2) possession of, the property involved.
Long ago, in the famous Conard case,4 decided by the Supreme Court
in 1828, it was pointed out that there is a loose and general sense in which
the term "lien" is used, even in the case of a mortgage. This loose and
general sense has not disappeared with the passage of time.42 Today,
38. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 911-19.
39. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 356-57 (1945).
40. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 5101 (3d ed. 1943).
41. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 441 (1828).
42. See Danais v. M. DeMatteo Constr. Co., 102 F. Supp. 874, 877 (D.C.N.H. 1952).
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therefore, just as then, a right, styled a lien, may actually include title.
On the potency of title, Harrison v. Sterry43 is instructive. There, the
competing interest was represented by the assignee of a chose in action,
as collateral security. Chief Justice Marshall said:
"The priority of the United States is to be maintained in this case, unless some of the
creditors can show a title to the property anterior to the time when this priority attaches.
"The assignment made to Richard Harrison is, it is contended, such a title. To this
assignment several objections have been made.
'C
"2. It is the assignment of a chose in action; and is, therefore, to be considered
rather as a contract than an actual transfer, and could be of no validity against the
several claimants in this case. The authorities cited at bar, especially those from 1 Atkins,
and William's Law Cases, are conclusive on this point, to prove that equity will support
an equitable assignment.""4
That an antecedent assignment of a chose in action, as collateral se-
curity, will be protected against a subsequent claim of federal priority,
was again decided in the Conard case.45 The potent effect of devestment
of title or possession has not been disturbed in the recent series of cases.48
On the point of title, however, a matter of great importance concerns
the effect of subsequent federal priority on previous mortgages. For a
long time, the Court held that such mortgages were not affected 1 How-
ever, commencing in 1933 with a mischief-making paragraph in the
Maclay case,48 the Court itself raised the question whether the holding
of the old mortgage cases is to be applied in jurisdictions where a mort-
gage upon real estate is a lien and nothing more. The Court again raised
that question in United States v. Texas,49 but once again supplied no
answer, that is, after raising it in 1933. Apparently, the repose created by
the older cases is still undisturbed as to mortgages in title theory states.5"
Insolvency Within the Statute
The effect of the statute involves insolvency of the debtor, but it is
important to note that not every insolvency is within the statute.
43. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809).
44. Id. at 300 (emphasis added).
45. See Brent v. Bank, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 612 (1836). The same result was also
reached at common law under the king's prerogative right of priority. Marshall v. People,
254 U.S. 380, 382 (1920); State v. Bank, 6 G. & J. 205 (Md. 1834).
46. United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953); People ex rel.
Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946).
47. See cases collected in United States v. Guaranty Trust Co., 33 F.2d 533, 536-37
(8th Cir. 1929).
48. People v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 294 (1933).
49. 314 U.S. 480, 485-86 (1941).
50. Earlier, any distinction between the lien and title theories was dearly disregarded.
Savings and Loan Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898). For classification of
the lien and title theory states, see 5 Tiffany, Real Property 1380 (3d ed. 1939).
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Insolvency within the statute must be of a particular kind and mani-
fested in a particular way. With reference to the kind of insolvency, the
statute applies only in cases where the debtor does not have sufficient
property to pay all his debts. This has always been construed not to ap-
ply to mere inability of the debtor to pay all his debts in the ordinary
course of business. Thus, where pursuant to state law a bank was found
to be insolvent and unable to pay its debts and to continue as a going
concern, and was taken over by the bank commissioner, but such insol-
vency under the state law was not necessarily with reference to insuf-
ficiency of assets, the priority statute was held not to apply.5 With
reference to the manifestation of insolvency, it must be in one of the
modes pointed out in the statute :52 (1) death of the insolvent; (2) com-
mission of an act of bankruptcy; (3) voluntary assignment by the in-
solvent of all 3 his property to pay his debts; or (4) in which the estate
and effects of an absconding, concealed or absent debtor are attached by
process of law. These modes, in view of their manifesting insolvency
that is both actual and notorious, have been said to give ". . . to the world
some reasonable and definite test by which to ascertain the existence
of the latent and dangerous preference given by law to the United
States.""
The lack of both kind and manifestation of insolvency is illustrated by
the Hooe5 4 case where a collector of the revenue had mortgaged part of
his property to his surety in his official bond, to indemnify him from his
responsibility as surety, and to secure him from his existing and future
endorsements for the mortgagor at the bank. The Government contended
that the priority claim intervened and avoided the mortgage. This con-
tention was rejected, and the mortgage upheld on the grounds that: (1)
as to the kind of insolvency, the Government had failed to show insuf-
ficiency of assets although the collector was, in point of fact, unable
to pay all his debts at the time the mortgage was given, and although the
mortgagee knew, when he took the mortgage, that the mortgagor was
largely indebted to the United States; (2) as to the manifestation of
insolvency, a voluntary assignment within the purview of the priority
statute, must be of all, and not part, of the debtor's property, and hence
a mortgage of part only of the debtor's property was not within the
statute. The case pointed out that the burden of proof is upon the Govern-
ment to show the requisite insolvency, both kind and manifestation.
51. United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U.S. 253 (1923). See also United States v. Crosland
Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 53
F. Supp. 436 (Ct. Cl. 1944); Kohlman v. Alexander, 1 A.D.2d 334, 150 N.Y.S.2d 134
(1st Dep't 1956).
52. United States v. Oklahoma, supra note 51.
53. United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805).
54. 1 Kent, Commentaries 246 (1896).
54a. See note 53 supra.
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Finally, application of the priority statute depends on the nature of
the proceeding in which it is asserted.55 Although the statute covers an
act of bankruptcy, the cases hold that, as to estates in bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Act supersedes the priority statute, and that the latter
statute does not apply in cases of bankruptcy. Hence, in cases of bank-
ruptcy, the priority of federal tax claims is to be determined not by the
priority statute, but by the Bankruptcy ActY6
II. GENERAL TAX LIEN STATUTE
This statute, now commonly known as section 3670,5' dates from 186658
and has undergone amendments. 9 Although contemporaneous construc-
tion may shed valuable light upon statutory meaning,60 it will be noted
that this is not available in the Supreme Court, for the first construction
by that Court did not occur until 27 years later, in 1893.61
The essence of the statute is that, for any unpaid tax, there is imposed:
". a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and rights to property,
whether real or personal, belonging to [the tax debtor] .... 2-62
The statute goes no further, and furnishes no criteria in regard to the
crucial words "lien" and "property."
The Terms "Property" and "Lien" Under the Statute
The broad outlines of the term "property" have been established as
embracing tangible property, intangible property such as a debt,6 3 and
after-acquired property" situated anywhere in the United States.65 Since
55. The curious differences are discussed in Rogge, The Differences in the Priority of
the United States in Bankruptcy and in Equity Receiverships, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 251 (1929).
56. Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1950); In Re Van Winkle, 49 F. Supp. 711
(W.D. Ky. 1943).
57. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
58. Act of July 13, 1866, c. 184, § 9, 14 Stat. 107.
59. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); concurring opinion of Justice
Jackson in United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
60. Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 40, § 5101.
61. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893). The Court said: "The single question
thus presented for our consideration is whether the tax system of the United States is
subject to the recording laws of the States." Id. at 213. The decision was "No." Although
the decision was thus limited, the case impliedly decided also that a secret federal tax lien
was good against a subsequent purchaser for value without notice of the lien. See United
States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361 (1953), and United States v. Curry, 201
Fed. 371 (D.C. Md. 1912).
62. See note 57 supra.
63. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955); Citizens State Bank v.
Vidal, 114 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1940).
64. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
65. See concurring opinion of Justice Jackson, United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
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Congress has not set up a system of property law, and there is no federal
common law,"6 it must necessarily be that Congress intended all aspects
of "property" to be determined in accordance with the only existing
system of property law, state law. Some courts have expressly applied
state law.67 Thus, in an important case, Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. Hous-
ing Authority,68, it was held that whether or not property exists in the
form of a contractual right is a matter of state law only.
It appears to one court,6 9 however, that the Supreme Court has looked
both to, and also away from state law, and that the better view is repre-
sented by the line of Supreme Court cases applying state law.
Akin to applicable law is the problem of uniformity. In United States
v. Gilbert Associates, Inc.,7 0 the Court sought the goal of uniformity,
declaring that:
"A cardinal principle of Congress in its tax scheme is uniformity, as far as may be." 7'
But it was previously determined by the same Court that differences
of state law may not be read into the Federal Revenue Act to spell out
a lack of uniformity.72 If uniformity is to be accomplished, in determin-
ing the meaning of property, it would seem necessary for Congress to
provide a separate, complete and continually up to date system of property
law, blanketing the nation. Until such time, the absence of federal common
law means that the state law of property must be resorted to and applied
in determining the meaning of property in the federal tax lien statute.
The other crucial term, "lien," is the name given to a right, exercisable
over the property of another. The right is usually defined as:
"A hold or claim which one person has upon the property of another as a security for
some debt or charge." 73
This security claim upon the property of another involves matters of
effect and enforcement. These matters are governed by statute in the
case of a statutory lien, and into this category falls the federal tax lien.
The federal statutes provide for enforcement by authorizing levy upon
the property of the tax debtor, and levy is defined to include the power
of distraint and seizure by any means, and the power to sell. 74 As to the
effect of the lien, a leading feature is the order of time in which certain
66. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
67. United States v. Winnett, 165 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1947) ; Jones v. Kemp, 144 F.2d 478
(10th Cir. 1944) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 107 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1939).
68. 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957).
69. United States v. E. Regensburg & Sons, 124 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
70. 345 U.S. 361 (1953).
71. Id. at 364.
72. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
73. Bouvier, Law Dictionary (3d rev. 1914).
74. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6331.
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events happen. Detour roads are also encountered which will be discussed.
The federal tax lien being entirely statutory,7 5 the rule is that the lien
is not to be enlarged by construction.7 1 We will also see how this rule
has fared in the Supreme Court..
Priority of the Federal Tax Lien
The statute does not in terms confer priority upon the federal tax lien.
7 7
On this account, the Supreme Court, in 1954,78 thought that Congress,
when it enacted section 3670, had in mind the cardinal rule, enunciated
by Chief Justice Marshall in 1827, that:
". .. The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim,
which is entitled to prior satisfaction out of the subject it binds . . . 9
This is the order of time rule, familiarly expressed "first in time, first
in right."
When Does the Lien Arise?
The order of time rule makes it important to determine when the
federal tax lien arises. There is some ambiguity in this respect. The
section imposing the lien does so "if any person liable to pay any tax
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand. . . ."0 This language
indicates that demand and refusal to pay are conditions precedent to
existence of the lien. The next section provides that "unless another
date is specifically fixed by law, the lien shall arise at the time the
assessment is made.""1 Since demand is not made until after the as-
sessment, the question has been raised as to whether the two provisions
may be inconsistent."2 The court which raised this question of incon-
sistency did not decide the effect of it, and the point seems not to have
been pursued. At any rate, the cases hold that demand is a condition
precedent to the existence of a lien, 3 and, moreover, that the burden of
75. MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940). See also United States
v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), to the effect that the lien "stems from"
the statute.
76. Libby, McNeill & Libby v. Yakutat, 206 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1953); De Laney v.
Denver, 185 F.2d 246, 253 (10th Cir. 1950). Although the cited cases involved a non-federal
statutory tax lien, the same rule would seem applicable to the federal tax lien within the
doctrine of Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
77. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84-85 (1954).
78. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
79. Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177 (1827).
80. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
81. Id. § 6322.
82. MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1940).
83. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 335 (1943); Ruth, Inc. v. O.S.V. The
Marie & Winifred, 150 F. Supp. 630 (D.C. Mass. 1957); United States v. Commonwealth,
288 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1956). See also 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6303, 6659 (1955).
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proving the demand rests on the Government."4 It has been further held
that a time difference in the assessment and demand has the effect of
postponing the lien arising until both requirements have been satisfied."5
The time when the lien arises was made earlier in the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, with that lien arising "at the time the assessment is
made."sG In contrast, in the preceding Code of 1939 the lien shall arise "at
the time the assessment list is received by the Collector. '8  The signifi-
cance of the change made by the 1954 Code concerning the commence-
ment of the lien is especially important to competing lienors who are not
clearly within the protection of a mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judg-
ment creditor under section 3672,88 because the lien seems to arise from
a mere administrative assessment 9 of a tax by an office whose records
are not open to public scrutiny. It is truly a secret lien.9" As to others
than the tax debtor, it remains secret from "the time the assessment is
rmade" until a local district collector removes the veil of secrecy by causing
a notice of lien to be recorded.
Under the 1954 Code, as contrasted with the 1939 Code, there neces-
sarily will be a longer period of time during which many federal tax liens
remain secret after the tax is assessed and prior to the time the first
warning of their existence appears in the public records. That period of
secrecy is of great importance to the attorney who must act and advise
his clients with regard to property rights which are subject to federal
tax liens which he cannot find out about but which may be a threat to his
client under many different circumstances.
The Notice Filing Provision
In addition to the matter of when the federal tax lien arises, we must
also note the "shall not be valid until" concept, expressed in the amend-
ments of 1913 and 1939, constituting section 3672, 9' whereby as against
any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor, the federal
tax lien shall not be valid until notice thereof has been filed of public
record. The 1939 amendment made further provision with respect
84. Cattani v. Korsan, 29 N.J. Super. 581, 103 A.2d 51, aff'd, 32 N.J. Super. 210, 108
A.2d 110 (1954).
85. Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 335 (1943); Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234
F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
86. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
87. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3671, 53 Stat. 449 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322).
88. Id. § 3672, as amended, 56 Stat. 957 (1942) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323).
89. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6203; Bull v. United States, 205 U.S. 247, 259 (1935).
90. See Id. §§ 6103, 7213; Grand Prairie State Bank v. United States, 206 F.2d 217
(5th Cir. 1953), holding that a federal tax lien recorded at taxpayer's domicile is effective
as to personal property located elsewhere.
91. See note 88 supra.
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to a security, as defined in the statute,9 2 whereby the federal tax lien shall
not be valid against any mortgagee, pledgee or purchaser for value, with-
out notice or knowledge of the tax lien, regardless of the filing of notice
of lien. These amendments, known as the notice filing provision, operate
to defeat the precedence of the tax lien resulting from the order of time,
as more fully discussed hereinafter.
First Lien Should Be Superior
Since the statute, as has been seen, does not confer any priority upon
the federal tax lien, a fair and reasonable construction would, in general,
end the question of priority between competing liens by the rule that,
lien for lien, the first is superior.93 Thus, the statute would not interfere
with or override antecedent interests in the same property which later
becomes subject to a federal tax lien. A person can create a lien on
property only to the extent of his interest in it; 94 no greater right should
be created by a federal tax lien which is not given primacy by Congress.
This was the view prior to 1950 with respect to federal tax liens; 95 it ac-
cords with the construction of the federal priority statute by the Supreme
Court prior to 1929.6
Supreme Court Detour to the First in Time Rule
Since 1950, the question of relative priority has not been limited to the
first in time rule, alone. The Supreme Court has annexed one detour, and
the Government contends for another.
Inchoate Lien
The detour annexed by the Supreme Court is the matter of inchoate
lien; a familiar matter, as we have seen, under the priority statute. The
92. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323 (c) (2), which gives this statutory definition:
... the term 'security' means any bond, debenture, note, or certificate or other evidence
of indebtedness, issued by any corporation (including one issued by a government or
political subdivision thereof), with interest coupons or in registered form, share of stock,
voting trust certificate, or any certificate of interest or participation in, certificate of deposit
or receipt for, temporary or interim certificate for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; negotiable instrument; or money."
93. This nearly became the law recently. In United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc.,
345 U.S. 361 (1953), the original opinion pronounced the rule that: "Without more,
priority would depend upon the dates the liens arose." Later, this statement was deleted
by authority of the court. Revealed in United States v. Albert Holman Lumber Co., 208
F.2d 113-14 (6th Cir. 1953).
94. 1 Jones, Liens § 9 (3d ed. 1914).
95. See Kennedy, The Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious
Career of the Inchoate and General Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905, 924-25 (1954). A good illustra-
tion is United States v. Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946).
96. See note 18 supra.
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background is that the Government had argued before various courts to
the effect that federal tax liens are analogous to the priority right estab-
lished by the latest series of Supreme Court decisions under the priority
statute.97 The first court to adopt this argument was the Supreme Court
in United States v. Security Trust and Say. Bank." In explaining the
analogy and its adoption, all that the Court said was:
"In cases involving a kindred matter, i.e., the federal priority under R.S. § 3466, it
has never been held sufficient to defeat the federal priority merely to show a lien effec-
tive to protect the lienor against others than the Government, but contingent upon taking
subsequent steps for enforcing it. Illinois v. Campbell, supra 374. If the purpose of the
federal tax lien statute to insure prompt and certain collection of taxes due the United
States from tax delinquents is to be fulfilled, a similar rule must prevail here. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the tax liens of the United States are superior to the inchoate attach-
ment lien of Morrison, and the judgment of the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth
Appellate District is reversed." 99
The result was to annex a detour road around the statute: a federal tax
lien is superior to a state statutory lien where the latter, although prior in
time and binding against the tax debtor, is "inchoate" at the time the
federal tax lien arises. Briefly stated, first in time became first "perfected"
in time.
As under the priority statute, 10° the Supreme Court reinforced the an-
nexed detour of inchoate lien by making its application a "federal" ques-
tion.' Needless to say, the Supreme Court's approach to the matter of
inchoateness was not from the standpoint of the federal tax lien, but only
from the standpoint of the competing state statutory lien. Lower courts
have confirmed that the federal tax lien is not inchoate. 0 2
It is interesting to observe the state of the law prior to the Security
Trust case. One commentator has given this vivid portrayal:
". .. Thirty cases in the lower courts had denied the supremacy of the 3670 tax lien
over antedating rival liens without investigating inchoateness. In applying the rule 'first
in time, first in right,' these courts had treated the federal tax lien the same as any other
legal lien having no special priority. Since none of these cases was brought to the Court's
attention in any brief, or mentioned in the opinion, the Court may not have realized
how far Security Bank departed from the traditional interpretation of section 3670."03
Looking to the later judicial history, the Security Trust case has shown
strong vitality in subsequent cases in the Supreme Court. In every
97. See Board of Supervisors v. Hart, 210 La. App. 78, 84-85, 26 So. 2d 361, 363 (1946);
Kennedy, supra note 95 at 922-23.
98. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
99. Id. at 51.
100. See note 39 supra.
101. See note 98 supra.
102. Ersa, Inc. v. Dudley, 234 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1956); United States v. Kings County
Iron Works Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955).
103. Kennedy, supra note 95, at 924-25.
[Vol. 27
FEDERAL TAX CLAIMS
instance, save one,' °4 it has been applied by the Court to the end of finding
a variety of competing state statutory liens, prior in time, to be inchoate
at the time the federal tax lien arises.
However, contrary to the situation under the priority statute,105 the Su-
preme Court has not questioned whether a specific and perfected lien will
bar the federal tax lien. On the contrary, the Court has indicated that a
bar does exist, stating in United States v. New Britain: 0
"Thus, the priority of each statutory lien contested here must depend upon the time
it attached to the property in question and became choate."'10 7
It will be noted that the Court described the priority of lien by the new
terminology- "choate." Since this rare term means "complete,"'0 " pre-
sumably it is similar to "perfected," and if thus fulfilled it may not re-
quire the element of "specific"'l °9 as included by the Supreme Court under
the priority statute.
The Will of Congress
Similar to the detour road around the priority statute, the detour road
around the tax lien statute was built by the Supreme Court without the aid
of Congress. Indeed, unlike the judicial support the Court drew from
its own opinions in launching in new directions under the priority statute,
the Court offered no judicial support whatever in launching its inchoate
lien doctrine under the tax lien statute. In the matter of the will of Con-
gress, no more here than in the priority statute is there any indication
that Congress intended the federal right to supersede a pre-existing lien
of any kind.
104. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954), involving city real estate taxes
and water rent. Here the Supreme Court was not too sure. Although the state supreme
court had construed its statute to create a lien that was specific and perfected, the United
States Supreme Court spoke guardedly, saying: "In the instant case, certain of the City's
tax and water-rent liens apparently attached to the specific property and became choate
prior to the attachment of the federal tax liens." Id. at 86-87.
105. See note 30 supra.
106. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
107. Id. at 86.
108. The rare term "choate" is amusingly discussed in 42 A.B.A.J. 608 (1956). It does
not appear in all unabridged dictionaries. Webster's 1957 and 1934 editors state: "Complete.
Rare."
109. However lower courts confinue to use the term. United States v. Kings County
Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232, 234 (2d Cir. 1955). The term was given another twist
in United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953), where the court said:
"In claims of this type 'specificity' requires that the lien be attached to certain property by
reducing it to possession, on the theory that the United States has no claim against property
no longer in the possession of the debtor. Until such possession, it remains a general lien."
On the point of possession, contrast the following from Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26
U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 441 (1828): "But it has never yet been decided by this court that the
priority of the United States will divest a specific lien, attached to a thing, whether it be
accompanied by possession or not."
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From another point of view, the will of Congress-this all important
matter-is not silent. In another field, Congress has conferred primacy
on a federal lien. Thus, in regard to the tax on distilled spirits, Congress
has long provided for a "first" lien."' Further, in regard to a distiller's
bond, Congress has long required a stipulation of prior lienors that the
lien of the United States for taxes and penalties "shall have priority" of
a mortgage, judgment or other encumbrances."'
Congress, therefore, is aware both of its power" 2 to create primacy and
the language 3 to confer primacy. With this background, when Congress
fails to use language of primacy, as in the general tax lien statute, does
it intend no primacy? Or does it intend some primacy, as in the case of
inchoate prior liens of others? The mere statement of these questions
points to the answers. "First" lien means just that, and "lien" means only
that with nothing in between. Congress, in these pieces of tax lien legisla-
tion, has created two kinds of liens," 4 one with primacy and the other
with no mention of primacy, but it has not created a lien with intermediate
primacy. This contrasting situation reflects a conspicuous intent of Con-
gress that the general tax "lien" attach only through the owner in accord-
ance with his property rights at the time the lien arises, and thus not
affect prior rights of others." 5
According to the general tax lien a preference over inchoate prior
state statutory liens works out badly in practice'16 and results in frequent
examples of injustice." 7 Furthermore, if respecting prior state statutory
110. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 5004, dating back to 1868 (§ 1, 15 Stat. 125).
111. Id. § 5177, dating back to 1868 (§ 8, 15 Stat. 125).
112. Brown v. General Laundry Serv. Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10 (1952).
113. Cases are collected in Peppin, supra note 1, at n. 38. A recent example is N.Y. Tax
Law § 501(2), providing "such liens shall be paramount to all prior liens or encumbrances
of any character," upheld in International Harvester Corp. v. Goodrich, 350 U.S. 537
(1956), the statute being set forth in 284 App. Div. 604, 132 N.Y.S.2d 511 (3d Dep't 1954).
114. The Supreme Court seems aware of the distinction, but regards it as irrelevant.
United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 and n. 8 (1954). Contra, Central Trust Co. v.
Third Avenue. R.R., 186 Fed. 291, 293-94 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 223 U.S. 721 (1911).
115. Accord, under New York statutes, Central Trust Co. v. Third Ave. R.R., supra
note 114.
116. Consider the unfortunate clash between two supreme courts-federal and state-
over the construction of a state statute. Perhaps the best example is United States v.
Security Trust and Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950), where the United States Supreme Court
disregarded the state court's construction in the very case under review and applied another
construction by the state court but in a different case. Another clash occurred in United
States v. Vorreiter, 134 Colo. 543, 307 P.2d 475 (1957), where the Colorado Supreme Court
considered that to agree with the Government's position would mean pulling down the
structure of property law of the state, which the court refused to do. However, the
United States Supreme Court summarily reversed, merely citing the Security Trust Case.
United States v. Vorreiter, 355 U.S. 15 (1957).
117. Consider a prior mechanic's lien being cut off by a subsequent federal tax lien.
The story has been recounted by the writer in the 1957 Proceedings of the American Bar
Association Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law 57, 67-71.
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liens will have the effect of hampering the federal government in the
"prompt and certain collection" of its revenues, it is the peculiar province
of Congress to say so by expressly making federal taxes a preferred lien.
Its failure to say so, in contrast with its saying so in another instance, is
strong evidence that no such hampering effect is deemed by Congress to
exist in the area of the general tax lien. For courts to undertake to say
that it does exist, when Congress has not, is a bald example of judicial
legislation.
Government Detour to First in Time Rule
The Government contends for another detour, springing from the
notice filing provision of the 1913 and 1939 amendments, mentioned
above." 8 The Government seeks to have the courts read this notice filing
provision as having the effect of subordinating, to the federal tax lien,
every kind of interest not specifically. protected, regardless of the time of
its attachment to the tax debtor's property. 119
In the Security Trust case, Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion,
gave support to this argument:
"My conclusion from this history is that the statute excludes from the provisions of
this secret lien those types of interests which it specifically included in the statute and
no others.' 1
20
This concept of "and no others" was uttered in a setting where the federal
tax lien was the subsequent lien, in relation to a prior inchoate lien, and
so viewed its application presents difficulty. The concept has been recog-
nized by a unanimous Court in two cases12 ' where its application presented
no difficulty in the particular case, the federal tax lien being the antece-
dent lien and therefore first in time.
Thus, in one, the New Britain case, the Court said:
"There is nothing in the language of § 3672 to show that Congress intended antecedent
federal tax liens to rank behind any but the specific categories of interests set out therein,
and the legislative history lends support to this impression."' 22
The Court's position was clearly limited to the effect of an antecedent
federal tax lien and, therefore, does not bear on the reverse, a subsequent
federal tax lien.
The Supreme Court has not decided the effect of Justice Jackson's
concept, in the setting of a federal tax lien which is subsequent and not
antecedent. It is submitted that the concept is not applicable to this set-
118. See note 88 supra.
119. Kennedy, supra note 95 at n. 99.
120. 340 U.S. at 53.
121. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. New Britain, 347
U.S. 81 (1954). The broad statement in this case must be read in the context of the fact
that the federal tax lien was the antecedent lien.
122. 347 U.S. at 88.
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ting, and specifically that a subsequent federal tax lien is ranked by all
antecedent interests.
In the first place, when Justice Jackson expressed his concept, he did
not have the benefit of two important points, decided by the Supreme
Court, because they were subsequently decided by that Court. These
points, announced in the New Britain case are: (1) Congress conferred
no priority upon the federal tax lien, and (2) Congress, when it enacted
the federal tax lien statute, had in mind the cardinal rule, first in time,
first in right. These two qualifications upon the federal tax lien clearly do
not affect, but actually protect, antecedent interests.
In the second place, when Congress enacted the amendments of 1913
and 1939, the evil it was seeking to remedy consisted of two decisions, -3
in both of which the federal tax lien was the antecedent interest. In sub-
ordinating the subsequent interest to the antecedent federal tax lien, these
decisions, it should be noted, accorded with the first in time rule. This
history, therefore, did not deal with a subsequent federal tax lien.
In the third place, the remedy that Congress applied did not deal with
a subsequent federal tax lien. The amendments of 1913 and 1939 did not
affect the arising of the tax lien-Congress left the arising undisturbed.
What Congress did was to say that, even when a tax lien arises, it never-
theless "shall not be valid until" notice thereof has been filed of public
record, as to the specified types of interests, and an even longer period of
"shall not be valid" can be applicable in the instance of a security as
defined in the statute.
These three considerations disclose no purpose to affect or displace the
interests of others existing antecedent to the arising of a federal tax lien.
This area was simply not involved; only the reverse area was involved.
This type of notice filing protection does not operate retrospectively 12 4
-it does not act as a notice backward in time. 25 In this light, the true
effect of the notice filing protection is, not the concept of "and no others,"
but it is to defeat the precedence of a federal tax lien resulting from the
order of time, when any of the types of interests specified in the amend-
ments arise in the periods that Congress has allowed;' 2 6 for one purpose,
the period between the time the tax lien arises and the time it is filed of
public record. When those interests arise other than in that period, or
123. United States v. Snyder, 149 U.S. 210 (1893); United States v. Rosenfield, 26 F.
Supp. 433 (E.D. Mich. 1938). See also United States v. Gilbert Associates, Inc., 345 U.S.
361, 363-64 (1953).
124. United States v. Peoples Bank, 197 F.2d 898, 899 (5th Cir. 1952) ; United States v.
Sampsell, 153 F.2d 731, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1946) ; Gower v. State Tax Comm., 207 Ore. 288,
295 P.2d 162 (1956).
125. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 657 (3d ed. 1941).
126. See Comment, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 829, 839 (1956).
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whenever any other interests arise, the first in time rule governs as a
general rule.
In the practical area, the Government's contention is refuted by Chief
Justice Marshall in the Hooe case. He pointed out that if the Govern-
ment's priority statute claim existed from the time the debt was contracted,
and the debtor continued to transact business with the world, the incon-
venience of that priority would certainly be very great. The Chief Justice
was shocked at the inconvenience that would operate in the future. How
much more shock where the inconvenience would operate not only forward
but also backward! The consideration of inconvenience puts far in front
the immensity of inconvenience to the business world that would result from
a subsequent federal tax lien reaching backward and destroying antece-
dent interests in the property. To produce this dimension of havoc, Con-
gress would have to put a time bomb into antecedent interests-to explode
when a federal tax lien subsequently arises. Such a congressional time
bomb, as we have seen, does not exist in the federal general tax lien
statute.
The Question of Property Under the Statute
As under the priority statute, it would be misleading to think that
defeat of a federal tax lien has to involve the difficult matter of inchoate
versus perfected lien, despite the prominence given that matter since
1950. The basic matter is the mandate of the general tax lien statute
that the property involved "belong" to the tax debtor. This mandate
often presents the question of property versus no property, for, of course,
if the tax debtor is held to have no interest in the property involved, then
he has "no property" in this respect for the federal tax lien to attach to.
In the Security Trust case and the line of Supreme Court cases apply-
ing it, there was no question whether the property involved belonged to
the tax debtor; it did belong to him, even though encumbered by a state
statutory lien. 127 But the question of no property has arisen in other
situations, and several offer instruction to the basic approach.
In the Kaufman case,' decided by the Supreme Court in 1925, the
Government claimed that taxes owing by individual partners should be
paid out of partnership assets prior to the payment of partnership debts.
The Court rejected this claim, saying:
".... under its very terms the lien includes only the property of the person owing the
tax; and in the case of a partner owing an individual tax, it extends only to his interest
in the surplus of the partnership property."'129
127. Great Am. Indemnity Co. v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. La. 1954).
128. United States v. Kaufman, 267 U.S. 408 (1925).
129. Id. at 414.
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The Court pointed out the same result had been reached by it, under the
priority statute, United States v. Hack 130 decided in 1834.
In the Ferber case, 3 ' decided by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
1954, the federal tax liens against the contractor were filed before the
construction contract was entered into, and a levy upon the owner was
made during the construction period and before the suppliers filed a stop
notice with the owner pursuant to the New Jersey mechanics' lien law.
In relation to the time the contract funds were payable by the owner,
several suppliers filed their stop notices prior thereto, and one supplier
filed his stop notice subsequent thereto. The court construed the effect
of the stop notices as requiring the owner to withhold payments to the
contractor until the stop notice claimant is satisfied up to the amount due,
or to grow due, on the contract. This was held to result in the contractor's
property right under his contract being "inchoate," and although the fed-
eral tax lien attaches to that inchoate right, it is not sufficient to enlarge
132
it for the lien of the Government can rise no higher than the right of the
contractor-tax debtor. The Court applied this result to the several stop
notice claimants who had filed their stop notices prior to the time the
contract funds were payable by the owner; and as to the supplier who
filed his stop notice after that time, the Court held that the contractor's
property right in the balance of contract funds matured at that time, so
the federal tax lien could and did attach to such funds to the exclusion of
the late stop notice claimant. All the judges concurred, including Justice
Brennan, now Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.
In Scott v. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church"'. decided by the
Supreme Court of South Dakota in 1955, the federal tax liens against the
contractor were filed after the construction contract was entered into, but
before the supplier had filed a statement and notice of claim for me-
chanic's lien pursuant to state law. The pivotal matter was a clause in
the construction contract whereby the owner reserved the right to with-
hold certain payments until the contractor, if required, shall deliver to
the owner a complete release of all liens arising out of the contract." 4
Because this clause covered suppliers' liens, and such lien had been filed,
the court held that the contractor had no property right in so much of the
contract funds in the hands of the owner as was necessary for the pay-
130. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 271 (1834).
131. Bankers Title & Abstract Co. v. Ferber Co., 15 N.J. 433, 105 A.2d 408 (1954).
132. In United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1942),
the court stated: "Yet certainly the section gives no evidence of any purpose to allow the
United States to mend in the district court all infirmities of title in the taxpayer's property."
133. Scott v. Zion Evangelical Lutheran Church, 75 S.D. 559, 70 N.W.2d 326 (1955).
134. This type of clause is widely used; and it is identical with that in the Standard
Form of the American Institute of Architects, Art. 32 of the General Conditions of the
Contract for the Construction of Buildings.
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ment of the claims of suppliers, who were therefore entitled to those
funds.135 A number of decisions, federal and state, were cited for the
proposition that the rights of the United States do not extend beyond
those of the taxpayer whose property is sought to be subjected to its liens.
Also, the court distinguished the Security Trust case which the Govern-
ment consistently relies upon for overriding those interests which stand
in the way of collection under a federal tax lien. Pointing out the distinc-
tion, and cogently describing the decisive question, the court said:
"The cases cited by appellant are distinguishable. In United States v. Security Trust
& Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 71 S. Ct. 111, 95 L. Ed. 53, upon which appellant principally
relies, the federal tax lien and an attachment under a state statute were applicable to
the same property. The Government had in fact acquired a lien on the property of the
taxpayer and the court was concerned with the question of the priority of liens. The
question in the instant case is not one of priority and perfection of liens. The decisive
question is what amount under the contract was due to Nemmers. The contractor had no
property right in so much of the fund in the hands of the church as was necessary for the
payment of claims of materialmen and the government cannot claim more than the tax
debtor Nemmers was entitled to."' 3 6
The no property concept finds application in the general law of con-
tracts.137  Illustrative is the Damato case, 38 decided by the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, in 1956. There, the federal
tax liens against the contractor were filed before the construction contract
was entered into. The contractor apparently abandoned the work, and
in any event the work left unfinished cost approximately $3800, in com-
parison with a total contract price of approximately $28,000. The court
upheld the contention of the unpaid suppliers that the contractor had
failed to substantially perform the construction contract and consequently
had no right to the contract funds. 3 9 With the defaulting contractor
135. Accord, Transmix Concrete v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 306 (W.D. Tex. 1956)
which involved a clause similar to Art. 26 of the American Institute of Architects General
Conditions of the Contract for the Construction of Buildings. See also Berkal v. M.
DeMatteo Constr. Co., 327 Mass 329, 334-35, 98 N.E.2d 617, 621 (1951).
136. 75 S.D. at 562-63, 70 N.W.2d at 328; accord: Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Housing
Authority, 241 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1957); Colusa-Glenn Production Ass'n v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
145 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1956) and authorities therein cited.
137. "According to the better view, in the case of an entire executory contract, which
the plaintiff without legal excuse has failed to fulfill on his part, he can recover nothing,
either on the contract itself or on a quantum meruit." 2 Sedgwick, Damages § 659 (9th ed.
1912) ; see also the life insurance policy cases where there was no debt because the insurer's
contractual liability had not accrued. United States v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.2d
880 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.
1942); United States v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 130 F.2d 495 (3d Cir. 1942).
138. Damato v. Leone Constr. Co., 41 N.J. Super. 366, 125 A.2d 302 (1956).
139. Accord, Colusa-Glenn Production Ass'n v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 145 F. Supp. 844 (N.D.
Cal. 1956); Vincent v. P. R. Matthews Co., 126 F. Supp. 102 (N.D.N.Y. 1954). See
also where the work was completed b3ut some suppliers were unpaid, United States
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having no right to the contract funds, and the tax lien of the Government
rising no higher than the right of the contractor, the money was awarded
to the unpaid suppliers. While there was some aspect of mechanic's lien
in the case, it was eliminated and the primary question stated, as follows:
"The question of the legal efficacy of the liens of the subcontractors is of no moment
if, as respondents contend, Leone had no right to any of the monies here involved. The
primary question is-are there any monies due Leone?-rather than-to whom are the
monies due, if not to Leone, under the contract?"' 40
Previous Assignments
Illustrative of both no property and also the notice filing protection, 141
is an assignment of a chose in action, where the assignment antedates a
federal tax lien against the assignor. The courts protect such assignment,
although on various grounds, and sometimes the Government does not
dispute. 42 Some cases 43 apply the no property concept on the ground
that, after assignment, there is no interest left in the assignor."4 The
same result has also been reached under the priority statute.ln Doubt-
less the courts will always be influenced by the traditional attitude toward
protecting assignments of choses in action, expressed long ago by Black-
stone, who said:
".. . and our courts of equity, considering that in a commercial country all personal
property must necessarily lie in contract, will protect an assignment of a chose in action,
as much as the law will that of a chose in possession."'146
Cases where the federal tax lien is filed antecedent to the assignment,
are clearly distinguishable'4 7 for they are an application of the first in
time rule.
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Miller, 143 F. Supp. 941 (W.D.N.C. 1956); Steelcraft Mfg. Co.
v. Hewkin, 148 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ill. 1956).
140. 41 N.J. Super. at 371, 125 A.2d at 305.
141 See note 88 supra.
142. Steelcraft Mfg. Co. v. Hewkin, 148 F. Supp. 872 (E.D. Ill. 1956).
143. United States v. Long Island Drug Co., 115 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1940); Royal
Indemnity Co. v. Board of Educ., 137 F. Supp. 890 (M.D.N.C. 1956); Alabama Tenn.
Natural Gas Co. v. Lehman-Hoge & Scott, 122 F. Supp. 314 (N.D. Ala. 1954); United
States v. Crosland Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792 (E.D.S.C.), aff'd on the only ground raised
by the Govt. on appeal, 217 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1954); National Iron Bank v. Manning, 76
F. Supp. 841 (D.C.N.J. 1948) ; Seaboard Surety Co. v. United States, 67 F. Supp. 969 (Ct.
Cl. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1946).
144. Salem Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182 (1924).
145. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828); Harrison v. Sterry, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 289 (1809) ; see also Brent v. Bank, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596, 612-15 (1836).
The same result was also reached at common law under the king's prerogative right of
priority. Maryland v. Bank, 6 G. & J. 205 (Md. 1834); Marshall v. People, 254 U.S. 380,
382 (1920).
146. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries *442.
147. Geitz v. Gray, 280 S.W.2d 859, 864, (Mo. App. 1955).
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Previous Mortgages
Related to the situation of previous assignments is the situation of
previous mortgages. The question has arisen as to whether a mortgage,
antedating the filing of a federal tax lien against the mortgagor, must
have been recorded, in order to enjoy the interest of "any mortgagee" as
protected under the notice-filing provision. The cases are in conflict, 148
and yet the statute says nothing about recording of the mortgage. "Any
mortgagee"--simply the holder of a mortgage-is precisely that, wholly
apart from recording of the instrument. 49 Furthermore, the no property
concept should be applicable to the mortgagor, at least in title theory
jurisdictions."°
It has been asserted to be the opinion of the Internal Revenue Service
that purchase money mortgages take priority over federal tax liens, even
where the tax lien is of record prior to the purchase money mortgage. 151
A similar result has been applied to a conditional sales contract which
was subsequent to a recorded federal tax lien against the purchaser. 52
An Antecedent Contractual Right
As discussed above, the Supreme Court has considered the effect of a
federal tax lien upon the interests of others. However, in every instance
since the 1950 line of decisions, the interests of others consisted of state
statutory liens. There, the Court seemed concerned with the proposition
that the state cannot by statute impair the standing of federal liens with-
out the consent of Congress.5 The Supreme Court, having granted the
Government's petition for certiorari in the Ball case," will now, for the
first time, be confronted with the interest of another consisting of an
antecedent contractual right. The commercial world will await the out-
come with extraordinary interest because the Government's position, if
successful, might subordinate a widely used credit arrangement-an
assignment of money, due or to become due under an existing contract, as
collateral security-such subordination being to a federal tax lien against
the assignor, which tax lien was not in existence when the assignment
was made, but arose subsequently.
148. Mason City & Clear Lake R.R. v. Imperial Seed Co., 152 F. Supp. 145, 157 (ND.
Iowa 1957) and cases cited therein; Winther v. Morrison, 93 Cal. App. 2d 608, 613, 209
P.2d 657, 661 (1949), rev'd on another ground sub nom. United States v. Security
Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
149. Rogge, The Tax Lien of the United States, 13 A.B.A.J. 576, 580-81 (1927).
150. See note 50 supra.
151. Mosner, The Nature and Scope of Federal Tax Liens, 17 Md. L. Rev. 1 n. 25 (1957).
152. United States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953).
153. United States v. New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954).
154. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. granted,
353 U.S. 956 (1957). See discussion of case at pp. 27-30 infra.
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Where the Tax Lien is Inchoate
Although it was said earlier 1 5 that the tax lien is not inchoate, and this
is the general rule, there is one situation where the lien is inchoate. This
situation is where a third party is in possession of, or obligated with
respect to, property or rights to property belonging to the delinquent
taxpayer. A common illustration is an indebtedness owing by the third
party to the delinquent taxpayer. This indebtedness is property, to which
the tax lien attaches. I5 ' After the lien arises, although it be secret, 57
can the debtor pay the indebtedness to the creditor-taxpayer without
being subject to the hazard of having to pay the same over again to the
Government? In a recent case, the hazard was visualized as follows:
"Where there is a tax lien outstanding against a taxpayer, it would seem that if the
Government chose to enforce that lien against intangibles to the fullest extent, then any
bank paying a check of such taxpayer, any insurance company making payments of cash
surrender values, disability payments or annuity payments, any party making payment
to such taxpayer for services, or any party settling either a contract or tort claim with
such taxpayer would be subject to the hazard of paying the same over again to the
Government. Except as to such parties that come within the protection of Section 6323,
the tax lien would for all practical purposes be a secret lien since it would come into
existence and continue from the time the taxes were assessed in Washington, D. C. It
would appear that the Government as a matter of policy has been sparing in its enforce-
ment of tax liens against intangibles of the kind noted. See Note, Effect of a Federal
Tax Lien on a Bank Deposit, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 412-420 (1957)." 15 8
It is believed, however, that hazard does not exist where the debtor, at
the time of making payment, has not received a demand from the Gov-
ernment for payment of the indebtedness, as in the illustration mentioned
above.159 Until such demand, 160 the tax lien, so far as it affects the
debtor, is inchoate.' 6 '
III. BANKRUPTCY STATUTE
This is the third statutory aid of the federal government in the collec-
tion of taxes. As under the order of time rule, 6 2 here again it is important
155. See note 102 supra.
156. See note 63 supra.
157. See note 90 supra.
158. Beeghly v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 726, 730 (ND. Iowa 1957).
159. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1955). The statute relied upon
by the court is now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6333 (b).
160. Prior to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 there was apparently conflict as to
whether distraint was necessary in addition to levy. See United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d
118 (4th Cir. 1955), and United States v. O'Dell, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1947). The basis
of this conflict has apparently been eliminatel by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 6331 (b) (1955), so that now a demand in the form of a levy may be sufficient. In any
event, it would be hazardous for the debtor, after he receives any form of demand from the
Government, to proceed at variance therewith.
161. United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 1955).
162. See note 78 supra.
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to consider the relative situation of the federal tax lien according to the
time it arises, whether before or after bankruptcy of the tax debtor.
Distinction Between Tax Lien and Tax Priority
In bankruptcy, a careful distinction must be made between a tax lien
and a tax priority,163 the former arising independently of bankruptcy,
.and the latter being a creature of the Bankruptcy Act. Quite different
consequences in bankruptcy are appended to each.6 4  A valid lien,
whether for a tax or otherwise, is, in general, a charge against assets
which must be met before distribution to claims, whether for a tax or
otherwise, entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Act. A right to
priority accords a federal tax without a lien before bankruptcy, a par-
ticular precedence over other claims but only in the distribution of the
bankrupt's remaining assets, that is, unencumbered assets after valid
pre-bankruptcy liens are paid. 65
Federal Tax Liens Arising Before Bankruptcy
Federal tax liens which arise before bankruptcy of the taxpayer are,
with one exception, safeguarded by the Bankruptcy Act just as any other
valid lien so arising. 66 They may be asserted against the property of the
bankrupt taxpayer to the same extent as if the bankruptcy had not inter-
vened.16 7 The mentioned exception includes federal tax liens "on per-
sonal property not accompanied by possession of such property," where
the lien is not enforced by sale before bankruptcy.'68 In this situation,
such lien is subject to a limited subordination' 9 by being postponed to
the payment of claims specified in clauses (1) and (2) of subdivision (a)
of section 64 of the Bankruptcy Act; clause (1) relating to certain admin-
istrative expenses, and clause (2), to certain wages. A federal tax lien,
attaching as it often does to personalty without any taking of possession,
may easily fall within this subordination.
Federal tax liens arising before bankruptcy, are, as in the nonbank-
ruptcy situation, subject to the order of time rule as respects relative
priority with other liens so arising."" In the non-bankruptcy situation,
163. Dallas v. Crippen, 171 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1949).
164. Collier, Bankruptcy Manual § 64.00 at 788 (2d ed. 1954) (hereinafter cited as
Collier).
165. Id. § 64A02 at 803.
166. Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118, 126-27 (1949);
United States v. England, 226 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955); California State Dep't of Employ-
ment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954); 6 Am. Jur., Bankruptcy § 949 (1950).
167. 6 Am. Jur., Bankruptcy § 949 (1950).
168. 11 U.S.C.A. § 107 (c) (1) (1953).
169. Goggin v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement, 336 U.S. 118, 127 (1949).
170. California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir.
1954); In Re Freeze-In-Mfg. Corp., 128 F. Supp. 259 (E.D. Mich. 1955).
1958]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
as discussed previously,"' the first in time rule was changed to first
"perfected" in time. Is this change applicable where bankruptcy of the
tax debtor intervenes? The Supreme Court has not decided the question,
and possible answers run deep.' 72
Federal Taxes Which Are Not Liens
As to federal taxes which are not liens before bankruptcy, 173 they are
placed on the fourth of a five rung ladder of priority,174 payable out of
unencumbered assets. They are placed on an equal footing with other
tax claims which are not liens before bankruptcy, and no preference may
be given to federal over other taxes; if the estate is insufficient to pay all
such taxes in full, a pro rata distribution is contemplated. 75
Taxes incurred during bankruptcy are a cost of administration, and
entitled to a first priority, 76 applicable to unencumbered assets.
In bankruptcy, the 3466 priority claim of the Government arising
before bankruptcy is assigned the fifth and last rung of priority,'7 7 ap-
plicable to unencumbered assets.
The Will of Congress
The Bankruptcy Act affords a remarkable contrast in the matter of
the will of Congress. Under the priority and general tax lien statutes,
where Congress expressed its will in only the most general and abbreviated
form, the Supreme Court broadened, step by step, the authority of the
federal government to collect unpaid taxes.
In contrast, under the bankruptcy statute, where Congress expressed
its will specifically and in detail, there are policies that look in the
opposite direction from those asserted by the Supreme Court under the
priority and tax lien statutes. Thus, as shown above, federal taxes which
are not a lien before bankruptcy are inferior to three classes of claims,
and are payable only out of unencumbered assets; the 3466 priority is
inferior to four classes of claims and is payable only out of unencumbered
assets. Inchoate statutory liens are dealt with by Congress' 78 much
more solicitously than by the Supreme Court. Granting that the courts
must carry out the will of Congress "in order to secure an adequate
171. See note 108 supra.
172. Discussed at length in 3 Collier, Bankruptcy § 67.24 at 264-67 (14th ed. 1942).
See also Collier § 67.21 at 856.
173. In Re Lambertville Rubber Co., 111 F.2d 45, 48 (3d Cir. 1940); see also notes
83-85 supra.
174. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104 (4) (1953).
175. Collier § 64.401 at 802.
176. Ibid.
177. 11 U.S.C.A. § 104(4) (1953) ; Collier § 64.501 at 812.
178. 11 U.S.C.A. § 107(b) (1953); Collier § 67.23 at 861.
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revenue to sustain the public burdens and discharge the public debts,"
this purpose is nevertheless the primary business of Congress. When
Congress has clearly expressed its will as in the bankruptcy statute,
such clearly expressed will should govern the judicial construction of its
more generally expressed will in the priority and tax lien statutes, instead
of the latter will being regarded as proceeding in a direction sharply at
variance with the former will.
CONCLUSION
In the collection of federal taxes, Congress has, in brief, provided
ordinary weapons-a mere right of priority, and an ordinary lien. Al-
though Congress has not elevated these federal rights, the Supreme Court
has done so by cutting off competing state statutory liens which are
antecedent to the federal right. The cutting-off has resulted from a right
of priority without a lien, and a lien without primacy. The judicial
process is the court's introduction of the doctrine of inchoate lien. Thus,
a time bomb has been put into the antecedent interests of others in the
property of the tax debtor, and in this way the Government has an interest
in the tax debtor's property greater than the tax debtor himself has.
The inchoate lien doctrine represents a detour road built by the
Supreme Court, without the aid of Congress, around both the priority
statute and the general tax lien statute. In the obscurity of the applica-
tion of the court's doctrine, there lurks an ambush for third parties.
If, as believed, the Supreme Court has failed to discern the true will
of Congress as to the scope of the priority statute and the general tax
lien statute, it is possibly too late for that Court to reopen the subject.
Possibly too late, because of the line of decisions under the priority
statute commencing in 1929 and the line of decisions under the general
tax lien statute commencing in 1950. The Supreme Court could, of
course, retreat in the future application of its doctrine of inchoate lien.
Failing this, the only other avenue for reopening is Congress. The outset
of the question can be briefly stated: Should any antecedent property
rights of third parties be taken for the federal taxes of another party?
ADDENDUM
The important Ball case 179 since the writing of this article, has been decided
by the United States Supreme Court' 80 In the first case of its kind, a bare
majority of the Court cut off antecedent assignment of money, as collateral
security, in favor of a subsequent federal tax lien against the assignor.
The opinions of the Supreme Court are even more important than the deci-
sions. Justice Jackson forcefully so reminded counsel upon the occasion of
oral argument of the famous steel seizure case, Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer. S
179. See p. 23 and note 154 supra.
180. -U.S. - (1958).
181. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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In relation to this view, the majority opinion in the Ball case is extremely
disappointing, for it reads in full:
"Per Curiam. The judgment is reversed. The instrument involved being inchoate and
unperfected, the provisions of § 3672 (a), Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. 449, as amended,
53 Stat. 882, 56 Stat. 957, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3672 (a), do not apply. See United States v.
Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340 U.S. 47 ... ; United States v. City of New
Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86-87 . . . .The claim of the interpleader for its costs is controlled
by United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 . .. ."
Four Justices dissented, on extended opinion by Justice Whittaker.
Although the majority did not say so, their action in reversing the judgment
below necessarily meant that the subesquent federal tax lien was superior to
the antecedent assignment. The latter, therefore, was cut off in favor of the
former. What were the grounds?
The majority reveal very little about their grounds. So little, indeed, that it
is risky to try to state the grounds. On this account, and at this risk, it may be
more helpful to attempt to consider the majortiy opinion in the framework of
some questions which seem fundamental.
The provisions of section 3672 (a), do not apply, the Court said. What are
those "provisions," and to what do they "not apply"?
The provisions are only of two types, namely, the effect of the tax lien not
being filed of public record, and the place of such filing. The latter did not
figure in the case. Therefore, the former must have been the "provisions"
referred to by the Court. These provisions read:
"Such lien shall not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector ... .
This provision sets out categories of interests.' 8 2 The Court, however, referred
to the "instrument involved." Presumably, the Court intended its reference to
apply to the interest created by the instrument involved. This interest was that
of assignee, as collateral security.
Was the interest of assignee within the categories of interests set out in the
statute? If it was not, then this basic ground would seem to make the statute
inapplicable. Such non-application, in turn, could have raised the correctness
of Justice Jackson's limited concept of "and no others."' 83 But the Court
seems not to have proceeded on the mentioned basic ground, for, in saying that
the provisions of the statute "do not apply," the subject is not the interest, per
se. The subject seems to be certain qualities of the interest, the qualities being
described as "inchoate and unperfected." These qualities seem to be the key
to why the majority thought the statute did not apply. In this light, the majority
seem to give the implication that, but for these qualities, the interest was other-
wise within the categories of interests set out in the statute. It would seem, there-
fore, that the Court treated the interest of assignee, per se, as within the
categories of interests set out in the statute, but held the statute inapplicable
because the interest had the qualities of being "inchoate and unperfected."
182. See p. 12 supra.
183. See p. 17 supra.
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What interest set out in the statute was the assignee interest within? The
latter was not so classfied by the Court. It would seem safe to eliminate the
interest of "judgment creditor," for this did not figure in the case. This leaves
the three other interests---"mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser." The courts below
principally invoked the interest of "mortgagee," and the minority invoked that
.interest alone, both being on the basis of state law. Since the majority ap-
parently invoked some interest specified in the statute, in order to give the
implication mentioned above, it could be that they did not disagree with the
courts below or with the minority in contemplating the "mortgagee" interest.
This view is not inconsistent with the Court's own general characterization of
a similar assignment: "But here the transfer was as collateral security. It was
therefore a mortgage of the goods and the returns." 84
Why did the qualities of "inchoate and unperfected" make the statute not
apply? There are no such words in the statute. Moreover, never before had the
Court applied such words to this particular statute. The answer may be that
the Court was extending its "inchoate" lien doctrine.'8 5 If this be true, the
extension was an extraordinary step. The inchoate lien doctrine was developed,
in the tax lien area, under the statute imposing the tax lien section 3670. The
Ball case, however, did not involve this statute; it involved section 3672(a),
whereby Congress created filing protection as to specified interests of third
parties. It is one thing, and going far, to elevate the federal lien by cutting off
inchoate interests. It is quite another and different thing, and going much
further, to use the inchoate concept to cut off interests which Congress has
expressly protected in language that makes no reference to the matter of
inchoateness. If, as may be, the Court did take this extraordinary step, then
we have another instance of the court, without the aid of Congress, building a
detour road-this time and for the first time, around the congressional filing
protection.
What made the assignee interest "inchoate and unperfected"? There is
nothing more than the majority's statement that this was so-a bare conclusion,
without explanation except for the citation of two cases. The citation of the
two cases suggests enlightenment to be found therein. The expected enlighten-
ment, however, was nonexistent to four Justices. They analyzed the same two
cases and vigorously assert "they are 1iot in point nor in any way controlling,"
and "they do not in any way support the Court's decision here." So, whatever
enlightenment in the two cases appeared to five Justices, in no way whatever
appeared to four Justices.
The minority did not leave in the dark the matter of "inchoate and un-
perfected." They discuss various points, from which they conclude:
"In these circumstances, I think it is clear that the assignment was in legal effect a
mortgage, completely perfected on its date, in all respects choate, and valid between the
parties; and inasmuch as it antedated the filing of the federal tax liens it was expressly
made superior to those liens by the terms of § 3672(a)."'1s 6
184. Conard v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 447 (1828). (Emphasis added.)
185. See p. 4 supra.
186. - U.S. - at - (1958).
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In summary: Congress has protected certain interests including "any mort-
gagee" against federal tax liens subsequently filed of public record; in the Ball
case, the Supreme Court seems to have read into congressional protection a
requirement that a mortgage be not "inchoate and unperfected"; what renders
a mortgage "inchoate and unperfected," and in turn, vice versa, is undisclosed.
In the congressional protection there lurks a judicial ambush-a potential
time bomb in the antecedent interests of third parties. Whether the judical
ambush will apply beyond the interest of mortgagee, and incdude the other
protected interests of "pledgee, purchaser or judgment creditor," is unknown.
That any ambush should exist for these important interests, which have been
congressionally protected, is incredible. Equally incredible is the threatened
judicial ambush of certain mortgagees, in connection with the federal right under
the priority statute.18 7 Congressional action has become imperative.
The American Bar Association, through the House of Delegates, has created
a Special Committee of the Association, designated "The Committee on Federal
Liens," to study the subject and to report to the House of Delegates at its
annual meeting in Los Angeles.188
187. See notes 48-50 supra.
188. 44 A.B.A.J. 384-85 (1958).
